Using a replicating portfolio method to capture the long-term risk loadings of Australian active institutional funds, we investigate patterns in how actual disclosed fund returns diverge from those anticipated by their factor loadings. We find that Australian funds' returns generate positive alpha, are tilted slightly towards big stocks, and tend to be convex to their respective benchmarks. This suggests that funds deviate away from their long-term factor loadings when their loadings are performing particularly well or particularly poorly. This pattern of returns is consistent with fund managers responding to their incentives of preserving capital relative to the market during downturns while maximising performance during market growth phases. In comparison, US mutual funds load on small stocks and do not generate alpha after size and value factors are controlled for. Furthermore, they tend to be concave to their respective replicating portfolios. Our research highlights the unique nature of Australian fund managers in timing market factors to generate excess returns.
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Introduction
We examine systematic deviations from long-run risk-loadings and their relationship with fund performance in Australian institutional funds, compared to US mutual funds. Using replicating portfolios formed from each fund's idiosyncratic long-term factor exposures, our analysis shows that Australian institutional funds exhibit a convex payoff pattern relative to returns anticipated by their long-term factor loadings, whereby funds tend to outperform their respective benchmarks at either end of the benchmark returns distribution. This convex pattern is also consistent with a positive model of market timing ability as described by Mazuy and Treynor (1966) , and is reflected in the mean positive alpha of Australian institutional funds across CAPM, Fama-French and Carhart factor models. In contrast, US mutual funds as a group do not exhibit such a distinct trend under a CAPM model. We find that funds in this sample have a nominally positive pre-fee alpha when only the market factor has been accounted for, but this disappears once the funds' systematic loading in small stocks, relative to the index, has been controlled for. Indeed, we find that US mutual funds tend to be concave to 3-factor and 4-factor benchmarks, and generate negative alpha even before fees.
A number of other key differences have emerged from our results. Firstly, we find that Australian institutional funds actually generate higher alphas once size, and to a smaller extent, momentum, have been controlled for. The systematic tilt into large stocks may be a consequence of the concentrated nature of the Australian stock market, which forces large institutional investors to over-invest in big stocks where liquidity is greatest. In contrast, US mutual funds rely on the size premium to drive their returns, and hence their alphas appear even worse after controlling for the Fama-French factors. Secondly, Australian institutional funds tend to deviate far less from their replicating portfolios than US mutual funds. Again, this could be because of the concentrated nature of the Australian market, which forces large investors to invest in the same core set of stocks.
However, such an observation could also reflect greater efficiency in US stock markets, which forces US funds to deviate further to generate excess returns. Lastly, while the large majority of Australian institutional funds in our sample tend to be significantly convex to their respective replicating portfolios (~80%), there is far greater diversity in the US mutual fund space, with ~35% being significantly convex to their replicating portfolios and ~54% being significantly concave.
For a rational investor, active management should only be used if the investor can earn alpha over and above their ability to load factors known to generate alpha (Chen and Knez, 1996) . Our results suggest that in the Australian institutional fund space this motivation is supported with the data, at least prior to fees. It must be noted that the behaviour of Australian institutional managers also appears to be consistent with their incentives to preserve funds under management during market downturns, and to increase their bonus payoffs during market growth. In contrast, analysis on US mutual fund data provides no evidence of outperformance as a group when factor returns are adjusted for.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows: Section 2 summarises the previous academic literature related to this study, section 3 provides a description of the data used, section 4 outlines the methods and results, and section 5 concludes.
Background
Our study is fundamentally related to the characterisation of risk in actively managed funds. Early work on the Capital Asset Pricing Model used the market as a single risk factor in explaining equity returns (Sharpe, 1964) . This was later extended by Fama and French's (1992) three factor model, which introduced the size and book-to-market (value) factors as additional explanatory variables in equity returns. The Carhart 4-factor model (1997) latter included momentum as an additional factor based on earlier work by Jegadeesh (1990) and Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) .
The above measures assume that asset risk exposures are evenly distributed across the returns distributions of the underlying risk factors. However, Kraus and Litzenberger (1972) show that higher moments of risk, in particular, the co-skewness of an asset's returns distribution to the underlying distribution of factor returns, is also a key dependent variable in explaining the pattern of asset returns. Harvey and Siddique (2000) use a refined measure of conditional skewness to help explain cross-sectional variation of expected returns across assets even after controlling for size and book-to-market, and find that the co-skewness factor has a risk premium of 3.60% per annum.
The co-skewness of portfolio returns to its benchmark is also related to the convexity of those returns to the benchmark. All else being equal, negatively co-skewed distributions to a benchmark are also concave to that benchmark. Mazuy and Treynor (1966) assert that funds which can outguess the market tend to be convex to benchmark -that is, they reduce equity beta when equity returns are poor and load up on equity beta when market returns are good. Conversely, a fund manager without timing ability would exhibit no such convexity to benchmark, which is what the authors find empirically in US mutual fund data.
This study also investigates the potential for fund managers to manipulate their returns distributions. Sirri and Tufano (1998) show that investors direct flows to high performing funds while failing to leave poorly performing funds at the same rate. This provides an incentive to manipulate the convexity of fund returns in order to attract greater fund flows, resulting in higher management fees, which are charged as a percentage of assets under management. Indeed, Chevalier and Ellison (1997) find that managers are incentivised to maximise their net asset value and manipulate the risk dimensions of the fund based on its calendar year-to-date return to meet this objective. Goetzmann, Ingersoll, Spiegel and Welch (2007) address this problem by developing a Manipulation-Proof Performance Measure which corrects for spurious "excess performance" generated through mechanical processes such as information-less trading.
Hu, Kale, Pagani and Subramanian (2011) also explore the interaction between fund manager incentives that leads to a U-shaped relationship between the fund's risk choices and its prior performance. These authors establish employment risk as a factor in risk shifting by fund managers and show a positive relationship between a manager's likelihood of choosing high relative risk and their probability of future termination.
Data
We use monthly returns for active Australian institutional funds in the Mercer Performance Analytics (MPA) Database. As an out-of-sample comparison, we also use monthly returns for CRSP US mutual funds. The Australian data from the MPA database comprise of active, domestic (Australian) equity managers on the Mercer Australian 
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Summary of Factor Exposures
We compare the returns profile of individual funds against their replicating portfolios. We construct three replicating portfolios for each fund:
1. Capital Asset Pricing Model: We adjust for the long-term exposure of the portfolio to the market. This is the standard CAPM respecified so that the dependent variable represents the portfolio excess returns over the market.
Portfolio return
Market return
Risk-free rate 2. Fama-French 3-Factor Model: As above, but with exposures to size and value premia also accounted for. We follow the method described in Fama and French (1993) .
Small Minus Big portfolio By construction, the expected value of the standard errors (residuals) between the portfolio returns and the replicating portfolio is zero. Table 1 summarises the mean linear regression coefficients for the creation of the three replicating portfolio models. These represent the long-term characteristic exposures of funds in our sample. Panels A to C in Table 1 present results for Australian institutional managers from the MPA data-set, while Panels D to F present those for US fund managers from the CRSP mutual funds data-set.
Australian institutional funds exhibit significantly positive alpha-1.47%, 1.74% and 1.82% per annum respectively for the 1-factor, 3-factor and 4-factor models-and beta slightly higher than the overall market. Our observation that alphas increase as more factors are controlled for suggests that fund managers short factors with returns premia, but compensate for this with additional stock selection skill and/or market-timing ability.
In particular, we observe from the Fama-French 3-Factor and Carhart 4-Factor models that Australian funds are short small stocks relative to the market, though they do not exhibit a bias on average along the value-growth axis. Furthermore, from the 4-Factor regression outcomes, we can also see that Australian institutional funds are, on average, slightly short the momentum factor. Past research has demonstrated the existence of size and value premia in Australia, though not a momentum premium (Kassimatis, 2008) .
In contrast, the average US mutual fund exhibits characteristics that are quite different from Australian institutional funds. Our three factor models show that US mutual funds earn -0.62% (1-Factor model), -1.10% (3-Factor model) and -1.16% (4-Factor model) alpha relative to their long-term risk loadings. However, US mutual fund returns in our data set are reported net of expense ratios. Adding back an average 0.8% expense ratio reported in Wermers (2000), we infer pre-cost alphas of 0.18%, -0.30% and -0.36% for the 1-, 3-and 4-Factor models respectively. US mutual funds have mean beta greater than 1 under CAPM; however, this reverses once size and value premia are factored in.
We find that US mutual funds are significantly loaded towards small stocks. This is likely to reflect the fact that US stock exchanges are much less concentrated than Australian exchanges, and have sufficient liquidity in smaller stocks to facility a greater institutional presence. While the 3-factor model does not detect any value bias, the 4-factor model indicates that US mutual funds are slightly biased towards growth stocks and slightly biased against high momentum stocks.
Excess Returns Relative to Replicating Portfolios
We then partition observations based on the returns decile of the contemporaneous replicating portfolio return, and estimate the mean difference between actual fund performance and that anticipated by the fund's factor loadings. This enables us to determine when funds deviate from their long-term risk characteristics, what impact this has on observed performance, and ultimately assess whether this may lead to adverse incentives for fund managers to manipulate their returns patterns in order to appear better than they are.
We measure divergence from long-term benchmarks by examining relative performance between the fund and its contemporaneous replicating portfolio under different replicating portfolio returns deciles. This measure is constructed by generating monthly paired observations of fund returns and replicating portfolio returns, and sorting these observations by replicating portfolio return. The sorted list is then separated into 10 deciles and the mean difference between fund returns and replicating portfolio returns in each decile examined. Formally, we test the hypothesis of whether fund returns are significantly different from their replicating portfolio returns in each of the deciles. We address the multiple comparisons problem by using a Šidák correction to control the familywise error rate. The individual error rates in each decile corresponding to familywise error rates of 10%, 5% and 1% are 1.05%, 0.51% and 0.10% respectively.
We reject the null hypothesis-that a fund's long-term exposures provide an unbiased estimator for fund returns within each decile of replicating portfolio performance-and find that Australian institutional funds systematically diverge from their long-term fund exposures (Table 2 , Panels A to C). Using a 1-factor replicating portfolio, we find that funds significantly outperform in decile one (the 10% of months with weakest market returns), underperform in deciles three to six, and outperform in deciles eight to ten (the 30% of months with the strongest market returns).
This distinctly convex pattern of returns is consistent when the replicating portfolio is formed using the 3-factor and 4-factor models. In the 3-factor model, which additionally controls for size and value premia, statistically significant outperformance relative to the replicating portfolio is still detected in deciles one, eight, nine and ten, but statistically significant underperformance is restricted to deciles four and six. In the 4-factor model, in which momentum is also accounted for, fund outperformance relative to their respective replicating portfolios is still detected at a significant level in deciles one, eight, nine and ten. However, unlike the 1-factor model, underperformance is not observed in decile five.
Across the three replicating portfolio construction methods, we observe Australian institutional funds outperforming their respective replicating portfolios at both extremes of the replicating portfolio returns spectrum, while generally underperforming when factor returns are neutral. In conjunction with their previously observed positive mean alphas, this suggests that Australian institutional funds deviate away from their long-term factor exposures both when their long-term factor exposures are performing very poorly or very well. The factor coefficients reported in Table 1 Panels A to C also indicate that fund returns are driven primarily by market beta, with a small tilt towards large-cap stocks. However, the consistency of the convex relationship between fund returns and their respective replicating portfolio returns, across the three replicating portfolio construction methods, suggest that deviations in the size factor exposure have only a marginal impact on the overall pattern of returns. The weak explanatory power of the size and value factors is evident when we examine the root-mean-square deviation (RMSD) of fund returns to replicating portfolio returns on a fund-by-decile basis (Table   3 ). The fund-by-decile RMSD is produced by counting one observation per fund, per decile, so that 10 observations are observed in each fund. The mean of individual monthly deviations is taken within each decile for each fund, so that funds are equally weighted rather than time weighted for the length of their respective track records. On a 1-factor basis the RMSD of monthly returns is 0.38%. This reduces only marginally to 0.36% after the size and value factors are included, and then slightly again to 0.34% with the incorporation of the momentum factor.
Overall, the behaviour of the average Australian institutional fund is consistent with that of a skilled manager with market timing ability, as described by Mazuy and Treynor (1966) . That is, funds shift into low-beta equity 5 in anticipation of poor equity returns, and high-beta equity in anticipation of strong equity returns. Such an outcome is desirable to an institutional fund manager in a number of ways. Firstly, they face large institutional investors who closely monitor performance and are sophisticated in terms of understanding factor exposures beyond market beta alone. Since these clients are few in number and individually account for large proportions of total asset value, termination by any individual client can result in large cash outflows, which expose the fund to significant drawdown risk. Hence, it is advantageous for fund managers to insure against tail-losses in the left tail, as they are observed to do in the Australian fund sample.
Secondly, portfolio managers are paid bonuses by their fund employers based on alpha performance. In this context, fund managers are also incentivised to load outperformance in the right-tail of the replicating portfolio returns distribution, as such a payoff structure resembles a long, out-of-the-money call. High watermark provisions in the mandates may exacerbate right-tail loading at the expense of performance in neutral benchmark return states. This is also consistent with our observations from analysis of funds in the MPA database.
Funds in the CRSP mutual funds sample exhibit a much less well-defined trend with regards to the consistency of returns convexity to their replicating portfolios across the three replicating portfolio construction methods. Using the market factor only as the explanatory variable in the replicating portfolio construction, we find statistically significant fund underperformance relative to their replicating portfolios in deciles one, three, four, five, nine and ten, and outperformance in deciles two, six and seven (Table 2, Panel C). No distinct trend with respect to convexity is immediately obvious in these results; however we show in the next section that by explicitly measuring convexity as the regression coefficient of portfolio returns to the square of replicating portfolio returns, the slight majority of funds are statistically significantly concave. Another key difference of US mutual funds to Australian institutional funds in the MPA database lies in the explanatory power of the factor returns themselves. While the respective 1-factor replicating portfolio produced a fund-by-decile RMSD in the Australian sample of 0.38%, the RMSD of the US sample is almost double that, at 0.74% (Table 3 ). This suggests there is greater market-timing variation in the US compared to Australia.
After controlling for size and value effects, we observe two further distinct trends emerging in US mutual funds relative to their respective replicating portfolios (Table 2 , Panels E and F). Firstly, we can detect a distinctly more concave (albeit skewed)
relationship between funds and their replicating portfolios. This is characterised by underperformance in fund returns at the extremes replicating portfolio returns in deciles one and ten, and outperformance in deciles two, three, and six. Further, we also detect significant underperformance relative to replicating portfolios in deciles seven and eight.
Secondly, there is a substantial reduction in the RMSD between fund returns and their replicating portfolios-from 0.74% in the 1-factor model to 0.60% in the 3-factor model, and 0.59% in the 4-factor model. This reflects the much stronger tilt in US mutual funds towards small stocks, as observed in Table 1 , compared to Australian institutional funds, which slightly tilt towards large stocks.
Convexity Relative to Replicating Portfolios
We explicitly test for the convexity of fund returns relative to their respective replicating portfolios using the following regression specification:
Returns series of each fund
Return series of each fund's respective replicating portfolio
Here, the coefficient of the 2 term, 2 , represents the convexity of fund returns to its replicating portfolio. Table 4 reports the proportion of funds in the Australian MPA database (Panel A) and the CRSP US mutual funds database (Panel B) that have positive and significant convexity, insignificant convexity, and negative and significant convexity. Significance is evaluated at the 5% level based on the T-statistic of the 2 coefficient of regression.
With a 1-factor replicating portfolio, we find that 80% of funds exhibit returns that are significantly convex to their replicating portfolios.
This distribution remains fairly consistent even after controlling for size, value and momentum premia in the replicating portfolio construction. Again, this may in large part be explained by the fact that average loadings on these factors are fairly neutral (i.e. close to 0) among Australian institutional funds. The only marginal difference after incorporating size and value, and in turn, momentum, in to the replicating portfolio construction process appears to be a slight increase in the proportion of neutral convexity funds (from 2.22% in the 1-factor model to 3.7% in the 3-factor model and 4.44% in the 4-factor model) and a slight decrease in funds that exhibit significant concavity (from 17.78% in the 1-factor model to 17.04% in the 3-factor model and 14.81% in the 4-factor model).
In contrast to Australian institutional funds, a much greater proportion of US mutual funds exhibit concave patterns of returns to their replicating portfolios. In the 1-factor model, a slight majority of total funds (52.74%) are significantly concave to benchmark with a much smaller proportion (36.05%) being significantly convex. The remainder (11.21%) reported a 2 coefficient that was not statistically significant at the 5% level.
When controlled for additional factors, an even greater proportion of funds exhibited significant concavity to their replicating portfolios, growing to 54.11% under a 3-factor model and 56.74% under a 4-factor model. There was a likewise decrease in the proportion of funds with significant convexity to their respective replicating portfolios, which dropped to 35.45% under a 3-factor model and 32.49% under a 4-factor model.
These results are broadly consistent with the results reported in Section 4.1. Namely, if
we consider convexity to be a measure of fund manager timing ability, then Australian institutional funds actually appear better after controlling for size, value, and momentum.
This suggests that these funds tend to short factors with returns premia, notably size and momentum, but make up for this with superior stock picking ability. These effects may be related to the idiosyncratic nature of the Australian stock market. For example, market capitalisation tends to be concentrated in large stocks, with small stocks having insufficient liquidity to be actively traded by institutional investors. Conversely, the proportion of US mutual funds that appear to have market and factor timing ability decreases after controlling for size, value and momentum. The strong explanatory power of the SmB coefficient here suggests that a significant proportion of the market-relative performance is actually attributable to a modest load on the small-stock premium.
Conclusion
We find that Australian institutional funds in the MPA universe exhibit, on average, a convex payoff pattern relative to their replicating portfolios. This is consistent with a Mazuy and Treynor (1966) model for funds which exhibits positive market and factor timing ability; these funds direct capital away from factors that are expected to underperform and load up on factors expected to outperform. Further, we find alpha actually increases once size, value and momentum factors are controlled for. This is predominantly explained by funds, as a group, being slightly short the size factor (i.e.
funds tend to larger stocks than the index), which in turn may be an unavoidable consequence of the concentrated Australian stock market.
This study supports a view of the Australian institutional fund space as being one in which funds are predominantly skilled market timers who are able to generate gross (prefee) returns in excess of their long-term factor loadings. In contrast, funds in the CRSP US mutual fund database tend to be concave to benchmark, generate negative alphas relative to their long-term 3-factor and 4-factor loadings, and rely on a small-stock bias to drive performance. This comparison highlights how skilled managers in the MPA dataset deviate from their long-term factor exposures compared to a group of funds in which investment skill is not immediately evident (i.e. those in the CRSP mutual funds database), and provides evidence for the use of Australian fund manager data to examine the behaviour of skilled investors.
There are a number of fruitful extensions to this current study. The data sets used in this study restrict us to comparing Australian institutional funds with US mutual funds. The analysis introduces a number of market specific differences that are difficult to control for, such as market size, concentration and efficiency. Should the data become available, a study of Australian institutional funds with predominantly large institutional clients against those with mainly diverse retail clients would help control for region-specific differences. Secondly, the mechanism by which a convex or concave relationship may be achieved relative to benchmark is not well understood. With access to holdings level data, we may be able to determine whether our observed return patterns result from stock selection, trading behaviour, or both. Finally, our results motivate further studies about whether the observed patterns of trading are desirable from a social good perspective, and whether the system can benefit from further regulatory oversight. * US mutual fund returns are reported net of fees. In order to report pre-fee alpha, we have added the average 0.8% fee, as reported in Wermers (2000) , back to the inferred alpha from regression. Table 2 : Mean excess return of Australian MPA institutional funds (Panel A to C) and the CRSP US mutual funds relative to their specific replicating portfolios across deciles of replicating portfolio performance. Replicating portfolio returns are generated as a function of each fund's long-term factor loadings multiplied by the contemporaneous factor returns, plus the fund's long-term alpha (see main text for more details). Deciles are individually calculated on the returns series of each replicating portfolio, and averaged across the fund samples. Fund returns were were sourced from the Mercer Performance Analytics database in Australia and the CRSP mutual fund manager returns database in the US. Factor returns for Australia are constructed from the Share Price and Price Relative (SPPR) database (market capitalisation), Aspect Huntley database (book-tomarket) and SIRCA Australian Equities Tick History (price levels for momentum calculation). In the US, these are sourced from the Kenneth French data library. 
